INTRODUCTION
While courts have little difficulty navigating through dense thickets of economics,' psychology,' science,' and religious literature, 4 they become utterly flummoxed when confronted with works of art.' This is a curious phenomenon because many judges are broadly conversant in art, 6 and artistic interpretation is quite similar to the textual exegesis that is inherent to judicial practice. 7 Yet, time and again, courts declare that they must abstain from making aesthetic judgments 8 on the basis that they are incompetent to do so, 9 and that any artistic definition or interpretation they might offer would be subject to the whims of personal taste. Art, it seems, is like obscenity: it is something courts know when they see, but can't speak about intelligibly. ' This rather hyperbolic judicial posture 1 derives from the Supreme Court's 1903 decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.' 2 This case has come to stand for the proposition that copyright protection is not predicated on the artistic merits of a work-i.e., copyright is not concerned with whether a work sits high or low on the brow. 13 This part of the Bleistein opinion is uncontroversial. However, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, went on to expound on the proper role of judges when faced with aesthetic controversy:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.' 4 In the hundred-plus years since Bleistein was decided, courts have refined Justice Holmes's admonition against the "dangerous undertaking" of artistic judgments into an interpretative principle termed the "doctrine of avoidance."' 5 This doctrine holds that law and art serve discordant cultural functions: law is concerned with providing social stability, whereas art is unpredictable and challenging to social conventions. 6 Furthermore, courts are not specifically "trained" in artistic assessment, and so are "illequipped" to address aesthetic questions. 7 For these reasons, among denotes the branch of philosophy concerned with the interpretation and meaning of art. See generally AESTHETICS: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (George Dickie et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989). 9 See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TuL. L. REV. 805, 814 (2005) ("Another reason advanced for shunning artistic determinations is that the judiciary has no particular competence to assess artistic merit.").
10 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (when faced with the task of "trying to define what may be indefinable," Justice Stewart famously declared, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . I I See infra Part III. 12 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (holding that commercial illustrations are "art" for the purpose of copy ight protection). That courts do not distinguish between "high" and "low" forms of artwork in determining the scope of copyright protection is often referred to as the Bleistein nondiscrimination principle.
4 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 15 See Farley, supra note 9, at 815. 16 See generally ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION (Brian Wallis ed., 1984)
(presenting critical essays discussing culturally provocative practices in postmodem art). 17 Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980) ("The question of what is art is inherently subjective, as 'it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.' It others, 8 courts refuse to explicitly state aesthetic opinions on the basis that doing so would discriminate in favor of one interpretation of art over another, 9 which could result in chilling effects on speech" and a covert form of censorship. 2 ' If only courts could follow their own prescription. Despite frequent insistence to the contrary, the very types of subjective and qualitative assessments that Bleistein and its progeny sought to avoid are inextricable from copyright law. 22 For instance, aesthetic judgment is required to determine whether independent contributions have "merged into inseparable.., parts of a unitary whole" for purposes of assigning joint ownership to a copyright and what (if any) part of the design of a useful article is "capable of existing independently of ... the utilitarian aspects of the article." 23 In addition, to determine the scope of copyright protection, courts must apply the idea/expression dichotomy 24 and the scenes a faire doctrine. 25 These doctrines necessitate filtering out original expression from unprotectable ideas and stock elements. This involves an appreciation of which artistic concepts are novel and which are customary to a work's necessarily follows that courts are ill equipped to determine such illusory and imponderable questions .... " (citation omitted)); see also Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to be to decide this case."). would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public ... it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt."). 22 See Raymond M. Polakovic, Should the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual Separability, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 873 (1993) (asserting that the Copyright Act requires courts to separate aesthetic and useful elements of a useful article); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 301 (1998) (" [T] he existence of copyright makes subjective judicial pronouncements of aesthetic taste necessary."); see also infra Part Il1. 23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); see also infra Part Ii. 24 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (stating that the Copyright Act permits "free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[P] rotection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."); see also infra Part 111. 25 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Walker v. Time Life Films, 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986); see also infra Part III.
I See infra
genre. Similarly, whether two works are found to be "substantially similar" depends, in large part, on the level of aesthetic specificity the court chooses to apply to the work. 26 Artistic intent is also frequently considered in determining whether a use of copyright material is sufficiently "transformative" to satisfy the "purpose and character" prong of the statutory fair use test. 27 Moreover, in some instances a judicial determination of artistic merit and ontology is explicitly mandated by statute. 8 In sum, when faced with questions that require qualitative evaluation of works of art, judges are forced to perform analytical jujitsu: first blocking with citation to Bleistein, then attacking with an ad hoc aesthetic theory of the court's own devising. 29 In performing this maneuver, some courts have focused solely on comparing the configuration of elements in a work that provokes an aesthetic reaction." This approach, known as Formalism, 3 regards other interpretative devices, such as accuracy in representation, expressiveness, an artist's professed intent, etc., as irrelevant. Formalism is perhaps best epitomized in copyright law by Judge Learned Hand's "comparative method" of assessing musical works. (1987) .
40 As Part III, infra, illustrates, courts combine the three aesthetic theories in their assessment of legal issue. In addition to leading to inconsistent outcomes in the case law, it should be noted that these different approaches are incompatible from the standpoint of aesthetic theory: Formalism explicitly rejects the author's intent as irrelevant to a work (i.e., the "intentional fallacy"), and Intentionalism concerns itself with formal properties or the work to see if the artist achieved their intended goal (i.e., "She said she was doing X, but the song actually conveys Y."). Reader-Response theory is more flexible insofar as it can go either way, so in that sense it is not entirely incompatible with either Formalism or Intentionalism except that it supplants the authority of both theories as the theory of art (i.e., the audience can respond however it wants, and there is not one single "correct" reading of the work).
of mediums protected by copyright law. As a result, doctrinal inconsistencies abound (both inter-and intra-circuit), 4 1 and the case law largely fails to provide clear guidance as to the scope of protection-and risk of liability-associated with different ways of making art.
Therefore, to alleviate this confusion, courts need to jettison the doctrine of avoidance 4 " and explicitly acknowledge the necessity of aesthetic interpretation in copyright adjudication. 43 This Article argues that courts should instead adopt a framework for making aesthetic determinations based upon a "Community of Practice" standard, roughly analogous to the "person having ordinary skill in the art" standard utilized in patent law.' The proposed standard would help resolve the confusion that so often arises when art is hauled into a courtroom. First, our proposal will help allay courts' fears concerning aesthetic determinations by providing a methodology for systematically sifting through art's historical and theoretical literature and obtaining input from experts. Second, our Community of Practice standard will enable litigants to settle many aesthetic questions ex ante, which would facilitate bargaining and extrajudicial dispute resolution. Third, our proposal will promote artistic innovation by establishing clearer guidelines for artists, promoting artistic production, and potentially reducing incidents of copyright infringement. 45 Part I of this Article details the various aesthetic theories that courts have used to make judgments, and analyzes the relative merits of each aesthetic approach. Part II discusses specific instances in which aesthetic judgments are required by copyright doctrine. Finally, Part III describes the proposed Community of Practice standard in detail and posits its superiority to any single aesthetic theory described in Part I.
I. AESTHETIC THEORY AND COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
Aesthetic theory is the branch of philosophy concerned with the interpretation and meaning of art. 46 At its core, aesthetics posits two basic questions: "What is art?" and "How should it be interpreted?" The former question, though important to a wide range of statutory provisions and 41 See Yen, supra note 22, at 274-84 (discussing the oscillation aesthetic theories used by the Second Circuit in determining cases involving useful articles). 42 See Farley, supra note 9, at 815. 43 This Article is concerned primarily with the role of aesthetic interpretation in copyright law. For a discussion of the legal significance of designating a work as "art" in other fields of law, see id. at 819-37. 44 However, the question of how art should be interpreted is very important to copyright jurisprudence, as discussed in Part III.
4
" In this Part, we will assess three major theories of artistic interpretation-Formalism, Intentionalism, and Reader-Response'°--that have been used extensively, albeit covertly, by courts."
A. Bleistein and the "Doctrine ofAvoidance"
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Court determined whether chromolithographs-an early form of color photographs 52 -that had been created for use as commercial advertisements were protected as "pictorial illustrations" under copyright law. 53 The respondents contended that works only qualified as "pictorial illustrations" if they were "connected with the fine arts." 54 The Court squarely rejected this argument, holding that the chromolithographs in question were pictorial illustrations protected by copyright. 5 But then Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, went on to say:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had leamed the new language in which their author spoke.... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to 47 See, e.g, NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding a statutory requirement that funding from the National Endowment for the Arts must take into "consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" when determining artistic merit and excellence for the purposes of grant-making); see also supra note 28. 48 prescription is less cogent. First, the "dangerous undertaking" that Holmes warned of occurs because "persons trained only to the law" seek to make final judgments on the worth of artwork.
6
" By negative implication, this would suggest that judges trained in art history or aesthetics might be qualified to make such judgments.
6 And even if a judge is completely ignorant of art, it might still be permissible for her to make aesthetic judgments if they are within the "narrowest and most obvious limits. '6 2 What these limits are, Justice
Holmes did not say, nor has any subsequent court. Second, Holmes argued that judges should avoid aesthetic pronouncements because the potential for "commercial," "aesthetic," and "educational" values implicit in a work might escape the court's attention.
63
"[I]f they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt."
'6 Justice Holmes's concern for the aesthetic preferences of persons "less educated than the judge" is admirable. 65 However, the link between aesthetic, educational, and commercial value is tenuous. Even if the Bleistein Court had accepted the respondent's argument that only works "connected with the fine arts" qualified for copyright protection, 66 necessarily follow that these works also have commercial, educational, or aesthetic value. A visit to the dumpster behind an art school would provide ample evidence of putatively worthless "fine art." Finally, and most problematically, the types of aesthetic judgment that Justice Holmes cautioned against were simply not at issue in Bleistein. The Court had not been asked to define "fine arts" or even to construe the meaning of "connected with the fine arts." 67 Rather, the Court was tasked with determining whether advertisements are "pictorial illustrations" within the meaning of the copyright statute. 8 On this question, Holmes maintained that aesthetic merits do not matter:
[T]he act however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not good enough to be considered within its scope. The antithesis to "illustrations or works connected with the fine arts" is not works of little merit or of humble degree, or illustrations addressed to the less educated classes; it is "prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture., 69 As such, Bleistein's warnings against aesthetic judgments should properly be read as dicta; Bleistein does not explicitly hold that courts must abstain from aesthetic judgments in all instances." Nonetheless, subsequent courts have cited Bleistein as requiring such abstention." 1 As scholars have noted, courts provide numerous reasons for avoiding aesthetic determinations under the so-called doctrine of avoidance. Courts have argued that aesthetics are inherently subjective and dependent on taste, which is outside the realm of what courts may properly decide. 73 Similarly, the principle of judicial neutrality has been evoked to forbid aesthetic decisionmaking, 74 which would elevate particular aesthetic preferences and theories over other equally valid ideas. 75 pled incompetence in artistic assessment 76 or have expressed concern that revealing their views on art would result in being labeled philistines, or worse.
77
Courts have pursued various strategies to implement the doctrine of avoidance, 78 such as substituting other issues in place of the aesthetic question, 79 focusing on the weight of evidence rather than its meaning," or simply concluding without supporting analysis. 81 However, none of these avoidance techniques eliminate aesthetic questions from the judicial inquiry: they merely shift such questions to the side, out of focus. This results in an incomplete snapshot of the law, leaving out the numerous areas of copyright law that explicitly require artistic judgment." In these areas, a different mode of reasoning cannot substitute for actual artistic interpretation. 83 As a result, the doctrine of avoidance-intended to promote objectivity and eliminate questions of taste-ironically creates a dynamic where courts must rely solely on their own subjective intuitions and apply them in an ad hoc fashion.
B. Brief Survey of Aesthetic Theories Used in Copyright
Sometimes covertly, often unconsciously, courts have drawn on artistic theory and practice for resolution of aesthetic questions. This Section offers a brief summary of some of three major theories of aesthetic interpretation often used by courts. Figure 2 , but it is drawn from the movie set. We do not consider a picture created by superimposing one copyrighted photographic image on another to be 'original'... 852 See infra Part III. 83 See Yen, supra note 22, at 301; Polakovic, supra note 22, at 873; see also infra Part III (discussing specific areas where aesthetic judgment is required in copyright law). 84 As Professor Alfred C. Yen has observed, the "analytical premises of copyright opinions are practically identical to those of major aesthetic theories." Yen, supra note 22, at 250.
Objective Meanings of a Work:
Formalism.-Formalist theory defines art based on the "peculiar qualities that enable certain objects, [but] not others, to provoke ... aesthetic emotion." 85 Following this theory, a good artwork arouses an emotional experience in a sensitive observer through the interrelationship of its formal qualities-line, shape, color, etc.
86 For a Formalist, aesthetic sensation is derived solely from a work's configuration. 87 Neither the artist's state of mind at the work's creation, nor the subject matter contained in the work, is relevant to its status as art.
88
Knowledge of the artist's ideas or biography may even be detrimental to a proper understanding of an artwork because these details might distract a viewer from fully appreciating a work's form. 89 If the meaning of a work is intrinsic to the work itself, then a viewer can discern this meaning through empirical inquiry without recourse to personal views.
9
" Thus, a single, objective, "correct" interpretation of the work is theoretically possible.
9 ' Moreover, because the focus in Formalist interpretation is solely based on the qualities of a work that are aesthetically moving (e.g., shapes that are pleasing, sounds that are harmonious), and knowledge of the artist's life or work is not required, 92 some theorists have maintained that a lay observer is capable of making aesthetic judgments equal to those of an expert. In this way, Formalism seems to provide an elegant solution to the problem of subjectivity and taste: art is not just in the eye of the beholder. For this reason, among others, 93 Formalism is a favorite go-to position for courts. However, Formalism has serious interpretative weaknesses and blind spots. For example, consider the following sentence: "Half the people you know are below average." Should this be interpreted as a statement of fact, or a humorous quip? Does it help to know that the phrase is popularly attributed to comedian Steven Wright? 95 The true meaning of the statement cannot be derived through the Formalist method because the source of the statement is not contained in the text. A reader-listener would have to know the sentence was written by a comedian in order to grasp its full meaning. 96 Similarly, Formalism utterly fails to account for many movements in modem and contemporary art that emphasize the conceptual and referential content of a work over its physical qualities. Under this definition, for a work to be considered art it must have arisen from an artist's volition: accidental acts of beauty are not art.' 01 As such, an objective interpretation of a work of art can only be derived from inquiry into the state of mind of the artist at the moment of creation.
2 For example, an Intentionalist reading of "half the people you know are below average," could identify that the sentence was meant as a joke, on the basis that the writer was a comedian and the sentence was uttered as part of a stand-up routine. 94 "interpretation is a function of identity," and David Bleich, wherein "meaning depends entirely on the process of symbolization that takes place in the mind of the reader").
consensus as to the "correct" meaning of a work, and interpretation is a mere function of the reader's preferences."' Thus, all aesthetic disagreements are unresolvable matters of personal taste." 1 ' Other Reader-Response theorists, however, contend that such relativism can be avoided if one presupposes that some readers are more accurate than others. For instance, an Elizabethan scholar's interpretation of the text of Julius Caesar is likely to be more accurate than a seventhgrader's. From this, one can imagine a hypothetical "ideal reader" or "intended audience" capable of supplying the most plausible (if never precisely correct) interpretation of a work." 2 Unfortunately, in practice, Reader-Response theory can often morph into an ersatz form of either Formalism" 3 or Intentionalism.
14 For example, if the best interpretation of a work is derived from its reception by the author's "intended audience," then this hypothetical audience is likely to hold values and beliefs that are very close (if not identical) to the persons that the author intended to communicate with in the first place." 5 Thus, the artist's intentions largely control the composition of the "intended audience," causing analysis of the audience's response to yield a result similar to Intentionalism."
6 Furthermore, Reader-Response theory holds within it the potential danger of discrimination against minority viewpoints, depending on how one defines a work's "ideal reader." For example, if preference is given to the aesthetic understanding of members of the putative "art world," then the viewpoints of people who are not members of that world are necessarily excluded. This excluded group would contain 110 
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many artists and art practices that have not garnered significant commercial or scholarly recognition, such as "outsider artists."" '7 This brief introduction provides a general framework for thinking about the fault lines in artistic interpretation and the challenges presented to courts in thinking through aesthetic issues in a systematically consistent way."8 Though it may be true that "[n]o one can say with assurance what a work of art is,""
' 9 this bare fact should not dissuade courts from engaging with aesthetic thought anymore than they should avoid similarly indeterminate areas of knowledge such as economics, psychology, and religion.
2° Moreover, as we will see in the next Part, copyright law demands that courts make aesthetic determinations, and rendering such judgments without acknowledgment of aesthetic theory has led to doctrinal confusion. Thus, because courts cannot avoid making artistic judgments, 2 ' they need to be cognizant of the theoretical underpinnings of these judgments, elusive though they may be.
II. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS IN

COPYRIGHT CASE LAW
In this Part, we provide an overview of instances in which copyright doctrine requires artistic evaluations. We also identify instances where courts use arguments that closely mirror aesthetic theories. Formalism, Intentionalism, and Reader-Response theories are all utilized, albeit implicitly, in judicial decisions on a wide range of issues in copyright law, including eligibility, originality, authorship, infringement, and fair use.'
22
A. The Province of Copyright Law: Works by "Authors"
The Copyright Act provides that a fundamental requirement for copyright protection is that a work must be an "original work[] of 117 
See generally COLIN RHODES, OUTSIDER ART: SPONTANEOUS ALTERNATIVES (2000)
(discussing works created by artists on the margins of the art world and society, such as psychiatric patients, criminals, recluses, etc.); PARALLEL VISIONS: MODERN ARTISTS AND OUTSIDER ART (Maurice Tuchman & Carol Eliel eds., 1992) (discussing the same).
118 Our discussion of aesthetic theory is not comprehensive, either in the breadth of the models presented or their conceptual depth. For a more in-depth treatment of these philosophies, see generally Courts have struggled with the meaning of these terms, in no small part because defining them requires an implicit inquiry into the creative process. For instance, on the one hand, the standard of "originality" is relatively low. It does not require novelty, ingenuity, or any particular benchmark of artistic merit. On the other hand, however, an "original work of authorship" implies some "authorial" presence. A work must be "independently created by authors" and involve some minimal "creative spark. mental conception" and "intellectual invention" of the photographer from unprotected photographs that consist of a "mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object."' 29 Although even "crude, humble or obvious" contributions to the arts are eligible for protection, "some creative spark" is nevertheless required.
3
In BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court held that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was protected, noting its qualities as a useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the same ... entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit."' Two different aesthetic theories animated the Court's decision. First, in order to assess whether the work was sufficiently creative, the Court turned to the work's physical form when it described the photograph as "useful, new, harmonious, characteristic and graceful."' 32 Second, the reference to the author's creative "selection and arrangement" of the photograph "implies that originality depends on the operation of a putative author's mind, and not the features of the work itself."' 33 The Burrow-Giles precedent set courts on the path of both Formalistic and Intentionalist interpretations of creative works. ("There is a very broad scope for copyright in photographs, encompassing almost any photograph that reflects more than 'slavish copying."').
130499 U.S. at 345. alleged author in favor of an analysis of the physical form of the plaintiffs work-a classic example of a court deploying aesthetic Formalism. The court held that any "distinguishable" variation between the original and subsequent work is sufficient to support a copyright.' 35 Discerning a "distinguishable" variation in a work requires aesthetic interpretation squarely at odds with the doctrine of avoidance.' 36 It is also important to note that decisions about creativity and originality are not presented to courts as simple, binary yes-no questions. Copyright disputes often compel courts to assess the degree of creativity in a work. Even if a work is considered original enough to receive protection, the amount of creativity involved affects the scope of protection afforded the work. Copyright law provides less protection (i.e., "thin copyright") to works that involve only modest levels of originality, as opposed to "thick copyright" for more creative works.' 37 In general, if a work displays only minimal creativity, then only slavish copying or virtually identical reproductions will infringe on the copyright of the work.' As a result, courts must distinguish between works that require less creativity to produce and those on a higher creative plane.' 39 In other words, it is not sufficient for courts to merely identify an artistic contribution; judges must 139 Based on the writings by Ginsburg and Gorman, it has been suggested that copyright infringement cases involve the distinction between "high-authorship" works, displaying "the individual personality of the author, through expression of emotion, imagination, and artistic creativity," and "lowauthorship" works, those with "rich.. also discern and distinguish between various levels of creativity, thereby implicating aesthetic theory. 4 
B. A "Spark of Originality" in Derivative Works
When a creator has reproduced a work that is in the public domain, an aesthetic evaluation of the "creative" differences between the original work and the reproduction is required. 4 ' Courts must distinguish between trivial or mechanical variations and variations that have a "spark of originality"' 42 or that are "recognizably" that of the author.' 43 For example, in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, the court granted copyright protection to a replica of the public domain Hand of God sculpture by Rodin.'" In doing so, the court praised the "precise, artistic" qualities of the reproduction, and commended the "skill and originality" involved, paying close attention to formal aspects of the derivative work:
It is undisputed that the original sculpture owned by the Carnegie Institute is 37 inches and that plaintiff's copyrighted work is 18'/2 inches.
The originality and distinction between the plaintiffs work and the original also lies in the treatment of the rear side of the base. The rear side of the original base is open; that of the plaintiff's work is closed. We find that this difference when coupled with the skilled scaled sculpture is itself creative.' 45 Similarly, in denying copyright protection to plastic novelty bank in the shape of Uncle Sam, a character in the public domain, the Second Circuit in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder stated that reproductions of works in the public domain must demonstrate a degree of "true artistic skill" that extends beyond physical skills or training, such that the artist creates a "substantial variation" of the original work.' 46 In analyzing the various differences between the original public domain work and the work seeking 140 protection, the court reviewed in detail the formal differences between both works:
Similarities include, more importantly, the appearance and number of stripes on the trousers, buttons on the coat, and stars on the vest and hat, the attire and pose of Uncle Sam, the decor on his base and bag, the overall color scheme, the method of carpetbag opening, to name but a few.
147
Yet, unlike in Alva, the court also considered art historical conditions surrounding the original work. The Batlin court noted that the Uncle Sam Bank did not belong in a "category of substantial originality," and was not the "creativity in the underlying work of art of the same order of magnitude as in the case of the 'Hand of God.""
Rodin's sculpture is also largely inaccessible to the general public so a significant public benefit accrues from its precise, artistic reproduction. 14 9 "No such benefit [was] imagined to accrue... from the 'knock-off reproduction of the cast iron Uncle Sam bank."'1
50
To some degree, issues of distinguishable variation emerge in all areas of the creative arts. For instance, in the context of realistic photographs of existing works, photos will receive copyright protection as derivative works only if the photographer has "recast, transformed, or adapted" 15 ' the original work in an original manner that cannot be deemed trivial.' 52 Here as well, the degree of creativity in the original work being photographed may factor into how much, if any, copyright protection is granted to a derivative work. 153
C. Useful or Expressive Works
Whenever a creative work also has utilitarian features, copyright law must assess the overall character of the work to determine whether it is copyrightability and infringement of photographs of bottle, the court analyzed the creativity of the original work that was being photographed: "The Skyy vodka bottle, although attractive, has no special design or other features that could exist independently as a work of art. It is essentially a functional bottle without a distinctive shape.").
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW eligible for copyright protection." 4 If a work primarily serves utilitarian purposes, its protection is the province of patent law.' In the overall scheme of intellectual property law, "technical" innovations belong in the patent sphere while "artistic" contributions belong in the copyright sphere.' 56 But, the practical implementation of this fundamental premise has proven extremely difficult. To exclude useful articles from protection, copyright law must draw a line between articles that serve a useful purpose and those that are merely aesthetically pleasing. Here, once again, courts are forced to engage in aesthetic evaluation.
The Copyright Act instructs courts to grant copyright protection only if a work contains aesthetic features that "can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects.""'
Additionally, when a work's useful and aesthetic features are so intertwined that they cannot be separated physically, courts must consider 154 The 1976 Copyright Act provides the following definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works: Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. (stating that lighting fixtures designed with unusual elliptically shaped housings were not eligible for copyright protection as works of art because there were no separately identifiable artistic elements). The court noted that the 1976 Act found ineligible for copyright "the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional considerations." Id. at 804. 156 The seminal case is Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). In Baker, the Court held that a system of book-keeping is not copyright eligible subject-matter:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government. whether there is conceptual separability between the form and function of a work, with copyright extending only to the form. To establish whether separate copyrightable features are present, courts apply opposing artistic theories of interpretation, often mixing various incompatible theories together in one decision. For instance, in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the Second Circuit held that the useful aspects of decorative belt buckles could be sufficiently separated from their ornamental aesthetic features. 58 In finding that the buckles in question "rise to the level of creative art," 15 9 the court referred to the intentions of the buckles' creator. 6 ' The court also invoked ReaderResponse theory by noting that the buckles were well received in art and fashion circles, 6 ' and by rejecting the notion that the utilitarian nature of fashion items excludes them from copyright protection. " [B] ody ornamentation has been an art form since the earliest days, as anyone who has seen the Tutankhamen or Scythian gold exhibits at the Metropolitan Museum will readily attest." ' 162 In other words, fashion items can be art when they are perceived as such by society.
In a different decision by the same circuit, however, the court followed a strict Formalist approach, finding that it was impossible to distinguish between the expressive and useful aspects of human torso sculptures that had been used as mannequins.' 63 The Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp. court reasoned that mannequin forms are not aesthetic creations because they conform to realistic proportions, e.g., "the life-size configuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders.
' ' "M In a spirited dissent, however, Judge Newman advocated a Reader-Response approach to conceptual separability:
How, then, is "conceptual separateness" to be determined? In my view, the answer deiives from the word "conceptual." For the design features to be "conceptually separate" from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article that embodies the design, the article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a 158 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980). 9 Id. at 994. 160 Id. at 991 ("Explaining why he named the earlier buckle design 'Winchester,' the designer said that he saw 'in [his] mind's eye a correlation between the art nouveau period and the butt of an antique Winchester rifle' and then 'pulled these elements together graphically."' (alteration in original)). 161 68 The court began with a strict formal analysis:
In creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose. These altered design features of the RIBBON Rack, including the spacesaving, open design achieved by widening the upper loops to permit parking under as well as over the rack's curves, the straightened vertical elements that allow in-and above-ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all types of bicycles and mopeds, and the heavy-gauged tubular construction of rustproof galvanized steel, are all features that combine to make for a safe, secure, and maintenance-free system of parking bicycles and mopeds. ... Moreover, the rack is manufactured from 2 3/8-inch standard steam pipe that is bent into form, the six-inch radius of the bends evidently resulting from bending the pipe according to a standard formula that yields bends having a radius equal to three times the nominal internal diameter of the pipe.'
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But then the court looked to the artist's intentions, noting that "he did not give any thought to the utilitarian application of any of his sculptures."' 7°U ltimately, the court denied copyright protection to the Ribbon Rack because the author had adapted the original aesthetic elements to accommodate the sculpture's purpose as a bicycle rack. As a result of these adaptations, the sculpture no longer "reflect [ 168 The court rejected the Reader-Response theory advocated by Judge Newman: "[l]t is not enough that, to paraphrase Judge Newman, the rack may stimulate in the mind of the reasonable observer a concept separate from the bicycle rack concept." Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147. perspective of the artist,"'' and it did not matter that the (altered) final product was widely celebrated as a highly functional, creative design. 7 As these opposing opinions of the Second Circuit illustrate,' courts face a difficult challenge determining conceptual separability. But by randomly switching between major aesthetic theories that are theoretically incompatible, courts make this challenge even more difficult for themselves, and as a consequence, the case law fails to provide artists with guidance as to the scope of protection available to such works.
D. Creative Transformations as Fair Use
Artistic determinations are inescapable when courts decide disputes involving alleged fair uses of copyrighted material.' 74 Aesthetic sensitivity is especially important to the first factor of the fair use test, which requires courts to assess the "purpose and character" of a purported fair use. (1) the purpose and character of the use; ... (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. first with new expression, meaning, or message."' 76 A fair use finding is more likely if "the secondary use adds value to the original-if copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings."' 7 Sometimes the determination of the "character" of an allegedly infringing use is straightforward-e.g., when a work is copied verbatim. 7 ' Many other disputes, however, involve situations in which a defendant has integrated copyrighted material into a new creative work without permission. In these instances, courts must dissect the "relationship" between the original copyrighted material and the allegedly infringing work to assess whether the use is "of the transformative type that advances knowledge and the progress of the arts or whether it merely repackages, free riding on another's creations."' 79 When drawing a line between new works that transform a preexisting work and works that are more derivative in nature, courts must rely on some comparative standard in order to evaluate the relationship between the original and the infringing works. Here, again, courts knowingly or inadvertently rely on aesthetic theories of interpretation. At times, courts seek to decipher the author's intentions. In Blanch v. Koons, for instance, a fair use finding rested on the observation that:
Koons Other judicial decisions on fair use mirror the Reader-Response theory. For instance, in the classic fair use decision involving 2 Live Crew's rap version of Roy Orbison's song "Pretty Woman," the Supreme Court ultimately determined-based on a detailed eye-of-the-beholder analysis-that 2 Live Crew's song could reasonably be perceived by the public as a comment on the original song." 4 Lastly, in a recent decision involving fair use of photographs, the Second Circuit applied all three major aesthetic theories.' 85 Parts of the decision relied heavily on Intentionalist arguments by referring to the stated intentions of the author. 6 Other parts focused on Formalist elements assessing the expressive nature of the work in reference to its "composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and medi [um] ."' ' 7 But 183 Id. at 1270-71 (footnote omitted). 184 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83. The court held that the rap version of Roy Orbison's classic "Pretty Woman" could be perceived as a parody, explaining: While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew's song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivetd of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. Again, the problem is not that courts draw from aesthetics in their opinions-this is unavoidable-but rather that they so often switch between, and blend together, incompatible theories. Is a work transformative because of the configuration of its elements, because the stated intentions of its author are clear and credible, or because of how it will be understood by its audience? Aesthetic theory teaches that each of these questions is valid in certain contexts, but if courts ask them all together it leads to a doctrinal donnybrook. As such, copyright doctrine is in desperate need of a uniform, coherent approach to deciding which is the right question to ask.
III. A "COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE" PROPOSAL
Surprisingly, the answer to this riddle can be drawn from its source: Bleistein. Courts have often read Justice Holmes's warning as a general proscription on aesthetic determinations.'
89 But Bleistein may be read more narrowly so as only to constrain aesthetic determinations in instances where judges are "trained only to the law."' 90 By implication, if a judge were trained in aesthetics as well as law, then it would be permissible under Bleistein for her to apply her aesthetic knowledge in settling a dispute."' Indeed, Holmes specifically envisioned that judges would do so, saying that even judges who lack artistic education may make aesthetic determinations within "the narrowest and most obvious limits."' 92 Thus, although many courts have read Bleistein as mandating an avoidance of aesthetic questions, Holmes's language in the case supports the opposite conclusion: courts may make aesthetic judgments so long as they are sufficiently well-informed.' 9 3 palette, and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince's work."). 
109:343 (2015)
However, it is not enough for courts merely to be conversant in art and art history. To avoid the discrepancies that have resulted from applying aesthetic theory in an ad hoc manner, 9 4 courts need to adopt a more consistent methodology for analyzing aesthetic questions. The simplest method would be for the Supreme Court to nominate a single aesthetic theory that would apply in all cases where aesthetic questions arise. 19 5 But such a bright-line approach is undesirable for at least two reasons. First, no single aesthetic theory is sufficiently broad to account for all manifestations of artistic practice.' 96 Therefore, to give preference to one aesthetic theory over all others would result in some forms of art being incorrectly interpreted and potentially disregarded. Additionally, establishing a rigid precedent for aesthetic judgments would reduce artistic diversity, foreclosing novel expressive forms that deviate from the theoretical standard.' 97 As such, a Court-sanctioned aesthetic theory could operate as a covert form of censorship that would chill aesthetic innovation, just as Justice Holmes feared.
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For instance, suppose the Court were to adopt Formalism as its exclusive aesthetic theory. 99 In this scenario, courts could make aesthetic distinctions solely on the basis of the precise configuration of a work's elements that provoke "aesthetic emotion," e.g., size, shape, color, meter, timbre, rhythm, pattern, etc. 2 "' Courts would not be permitted to consider the artist's state of mind or intention in creating the work. 2 "' If a court were 194 See supra Part III; see also Yen, supra note 22, at 298 ("[F]amiliarity with aesthetic theory shows that courts are essentially swapping one set of aesthetic premises for others in response to the facts of particular cases.").
195 See Yen, supra note 22, at 300. 196 Compare BELL, supra note 31, at 17 (defining a formalist approach to art criticism), with Beardsley, supra note 34, at 21 ("[A]n artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest."), and DICKIE, supra note 36, at 35-37 (arguing that an object becomes art when it is presented to members of the art world for aesthetic consideration See, e.g., BELL, supra note 31, at 19 ("In pure aesthetics we have only to consider our emotion and its object: for the purposes of aesthetics we have no right, neither is there any necessity, to pry behind the object into the state of mind of him who made it."); see also Clement Greenberg, Modernist then to apply this analytical framework to Marcel Duchamp's "readymade '2°2 sculpture Fountain 2°3 -widely considered the most influential artwork of the twentieth century 2 o 4 -the piece would fail to qualify as art. From a Formalist perspective, the physical qualities of Fountain are indistinguishable from a mere functional object (i.e., a urinal), so it lacks formal elements that would bring about an aesthetic experience. 25 As such, if courts followed Formalism exclusively, they would be blinded to many of the aesthetic innovations that have informed twentieth-and twenty-first-century creative practice.
20 6 This blindness, in turn, would have a considerable chilling effect on future concept-based works that deemphasize the making of aesthetically pleasing objects in favor of expressions of art as an idea. 20 7 Suppose, instead, that the Court were to choose Intentionalism as its preferred aesthetic theory. This theoretical orientation would admit a far greater range of expressive practices than would Formalism. 20 However, discovering the substantive meaning of a work from its author's professed intentions would create significant evidentiary problems and opportunities for outright chicanery. For instance, it would be difficult to divine with any measure of precision the exact intentions of a deceased or otherwise unavailable artist." Further, artists might disclaim having had artistic intentions, 21° be unable to adequately express what their artistic intentions were, or strategically reimagine their intentions ex post facto to benefit their litigation posture. And, perhaps most importantly, artists' intentions might not align with the actual result of their labors, as is the case with socalled happy accidents. 2" ' Such inferential and evidentiary challenges are not insurmountable; criminal courts regularly overcome similar obstacles to ascertain a defendant's mens rea. But given that courts are reluctant to engage in aesthetic thought generally, the adoption of an Intentionalist standard would likely be met with steep resistance. An alternative way that courts might approach aesthetic judgments is through the lens of the "ordinary observer" test used to determine substantial similarity."' This test does not involve analytic "dissection and expert testimony," ' but rather depends on whether the accused work has appropriated the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted work. 214 So, rather than surveying different theories in order to map the best aesthetic topography for a particular work, courts would instead address questions of law in the same way that juries address questions of fact: by relying upon their intuitive sense of whether the "aesthetic appeal of the work is the same" to the eyes of a lay observer." 5 The problems with this approach, however, are myriad. ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.").
inconsistencies discussed above.
2 " 6 A work's "total concept and feel" is inherently subject to the quirks of individual taste and sophistication, and so decisions of law based on it are no more likely to be consistent than decisions subscribing to the doctrine of avoidance. 2 7 Both approaches result in courts making ad hoc aesthetic determinations that provide little guidance to future litigants, or to the law generally. Likewise, for all its shortcomings, the doctrine of avoidance at least has the benefit of imposing a measure of judicial modesty that guards against the dangers of discrimination and chilling that worried Justice Holmes. 218 Furthermore, the ordinary observer test is itself theoretically problematic. At its connotative root, the "total concept and feel" test 2 19 evokes incompatible aesthetic views. For instance, the "concept" of a work cannot be established merely from its formal qualities. Rather, the trier of fact must consider external references such as an author's professed intentions, contemporaneous artistic practices, art history, social mores, cultural symbols, and more.1 2 2 Because of this, consideration of a work's concept necessitates the use of Intentionalism or Reader-Response theory (and most likely both). 22 ' By contrast, the "feel" of a work might come directly from the work's aesthetic qualities (Formalism),1 2 or it could be influenced by the context in which the work is received (ReaderResponse). 2 3 Therefore, by requiring both concept and feel, the ordinary observer test implicitly creates an aesthetic dissonance that cannot be resolved harmoniously by courts.
Luckily, these difficulties can largely be avoided by reorienting the debate from what aesthetic theory should be applied to how courts should go about applying any aesthetic theory-in other words, by shifting the question from the substantive to the procedural. This reorientation can be achieved through the judicial adoption 2 24 of a "Community of Practice" standard for aesthetic questions. 25 Our proposed Community of Practice method operates in two steps. First, the court, as briefed by the parties, would outline the general community of artistic practice from which the works in question hail. This community could be the artworld of mainstream museums, galleries, critics, etc., but it need not be so. All that is required is that the community be an accurate reflection of the aesthetic norms and traditions that informed the works.
Second, a hypothetical viewer is imagined who is part of the Community of Practice and possesses aesthetic insights that are appropriate to the interpretative questions at issue. For instance, this viewer may be the "ideal reader" of a given text, 226 or may represent a consensus of aesthetic views held by persons that have studied the arts or literature. 227 Or the viewer could be unfamiliar with mainstream artistic theory and practice, as would be appropriate when dealing with outsider art 2 2 1 or works based in specific cultural traditions. 29 In this way, the hypothetical viewer would not be limited to any specific aesthetic theory, just as a real person might alter their aesthetic criteria as they move from gallery to gallery in a museum--or from a museum out into the street. The viewer would adopt whichever theory is most sensitive to the nature of the work presented. For instance, a viewer might offer a Formalist account of a work of twelve-tone music, 23 whereas they would likely apply an Intentionalist critique to a otherwise. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2010); cf JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-09 (Peter Smith 1930) (arguing that judicial decisions were primarily motivated by the psychological influences on the judges). This is a fair point. However, because a thorough unpacking of this criticism is beyond the scope of this Article, we will not answer this criticism except to say that even if judges do ultimately decide based on exogenous factors, having a more rigorous analytical framework for them to contend with on the way is likely to ultimately yield greater doctrinal consistency overall. 225 This proposed standard is similar in some ways to the Reader-Response "intended audience"
test. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Reader-Response theory. But see Yen, supra note 22, at 294-95 (noting that "intended audience" tests have three basic problems: (1) "authors may not have specific audiences in mind when they create a work"; (2) "the audience that forms the market... may not be the audience the author intended"; and (3) "the people for whom an author intends his work are still prone to disagree over the proper interpretation of the work" piece of Appropriation Art. 231 Once the hypothetical viewer's aesthetic orientation is established, 2 32 a court can answer questions presented based on the expected response of a viewer from the Community of Practice. As such, the Community of Practice method provides a more exact means of settling aesthetic disputes in a consistent and astute manner than the current ad hoc arrangement.
While the exact parameters of the Community of Practice standard proposed here are novel, precursors can be found throughout copyright law, most notably in Arnstein v. Porter. 2 33 There, to determine whether wellknown songwriter Cole Porter infringed on the plaintiffs songs, the appellate court directed the lower court to consider the aesthetic views of real people ("lay listeners") in terms of "what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed." ' 234 By the court's reckoning, not all lay opinions are equally valid. It was the aesthetic views of those who "comprise the audience" for the songs that mattered to the disposition of the case. 2 35 Thus, the Arnstein court implicitly set out a selection procedure for determining which lay opinions a court should heed: an "intended audience" test. 236 This intended audience need not be made up of actual persons who are familiar with the works at issue (say, a jury made up of Cole Porter fans), but rather may be inferred from expert testimony as to the presumed reactions of listeners for whom the songs were written. 237 In other words, the intended audience is a composite built from the nature of the work itself (e.g., this song was written for that type of person) and the contexts in which the work might be presented.
Our proposed interpretative scheme also bears resemblance to the legal fiction of the "person having ordinary skill in the art" standard used in patent law. 23 ' As with all legal fictions, the purpose of the hypothetical 231 See, e.g., Sergio Mufioz Sarmiento, Judicial Activism and the Return of Formalism in the viewer is not to mimic how an actual person might respond to a given work of art, but rather to develop a baseline understanding of what a person from the Community of Practice would see as aesthetically valuable. Moreover, just as the standard for reasonableness in torts is adaptable to changing circumstances, so, too, would a Community of Practice standard be responsive to artistic innovation without sacrificing judicial consistency. Our proposed standard is objective in the sense that it is not the opinion of the court or the jury that disposes of the question, but rather what they objectively reckon a member of the Community of Practice would think under the circumstances. 239 It should be noted that our proposal embraces some measure of Formalism, albeit of process rather than substance. It is important to recognize that not all formalisms are equivalent. As discussed above, the application of aesthetic Formalism provides little (if any) method for understanding works that do not rely on formal considerations as part of their aesthetic processes, such as Conceptual Art, Punk, or Cinema Verit6. Procedural formalism does not have this effect. Just because a formal process is followed to determine what standards to apply to a given piece of work does not mean that the standard applied will always (or ever) be Formalism. Indeed, a court following the Community of Practice Standard could just as easily decide that Intentionalism, or Reader-Response, or some other theory not yet developed, is the best method for comparing two works of art. In other words, rigor in method can yield flexibility in thought. 4 While this standard would still leave a measure of unpredictability as to the outcome of aesthetic questions, 24 " ' it would nevertheless help to rectify the confusion that arises when art is hauled into a courtroom. First, litigants would be aware of the analytical procedure used to settle aesthetic questions ex ante, which would facilitate bargaining and extrajudicial dispute resolution, as litigants would have a clearer sense of the merits of their claims. 242 Second, the Community of Practice standard would help allay courts' fears of engaging in aesthetic determinations by providing a methodology for systematically sifting through art theory and historical literature and for obtaining input from experts, practitioners, and amici.
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For instance, courts could go about defining the Community of Practice in a manner roughly analogous to the way that patent examiners go about surveying the prior art to determine whether an invention is nonobvious. 2 " Lastly, the Community of Practice standard would serve to promote artistic innovation by establishing clearer guidelines for artists and their counsel, 245 which would likely have the salutary effect of increasing artistic production, as artists would have a better idea of what is-and isn'tprotected by copyright. 246 In sum, under this proposed framework, courts would approach aesthetic questions in much the same way they approach an individual's conduct in tort: under this set of (aesthetic) circumstances, what actions are to be reasonably expected, and how should a reasonably informed person respond? CONCLUSION It is worth remembering that courts adopted the doctrine of avoidance 24 7 for a noble reason: "The taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
2 48 As Justice Holmes asserted, and subsequent courts have been keenly aware, 249 artistic pursuits are different from other endeavors, sharing more with the dark machinery of the human spirit than the quotidian matters that are courts' normal concern. And it is precisely the animating purpose of copyright law. 25 It is thus proper for courts to exercise humility and restraint when addressing questions that could irreparably harm the creative process. The adverse effects of judicial overreach that Justice Holmes imagined 2 --discrimination, chilling effects, or even covert censorship-remain as virulent today as they were in
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Yet, for all its commonsense appeal and apparent virtue, the doctrine of avoidance does more harm than good." 3 Copyright law demands that courts actively engage with aesthetic issues, and no amount of evasion can change this fact. '54 This feature of copyright is neither an unfortunate byproduct of misguided doctrine nor the result of the inevitable vagaries of litigation. Rather it is at the very heart of the constitutional imperative that copyright must answer: What is the best way to promote progress in the arts? 255 Courts must engage with aesthetic questions because artists need guidance about the legal protections copyright affords, 2 56 not because jurists are superior arbiters of aesthetic controversy, 257 but because artists and arts communities suffer in the absence of a clear map to the contours of copyright law. 25 When confusion and misunderstanding of the law abound, the result is unwarranted fear and anxiety among artists that result in a reluctance to undertake projects that venture towards uncertain legal terrain. 9 In this way, the social ills that Justice Holmes sought to prevent have ironically come to pass precisely because of aesthetic avoidance and the doctrinal confusion it produces. 260 For this reason, if for no other, courts must accept their responsibility to fully engage with aesthetic theory and practice-the law commands it, and artistic progress requires it. To this end, our Community of Practice proposal provides a way for courts to adopt a uniform approach to aesthetic judgments that will provide doctrinal lucidity, improve ex ante certainty, and promote artistic innovation.
